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of Civil Defense 
Two ominous events-the t&ing of giant weep 
ons in the Soviet Union and the sponmmhip of 
fallout shelters by our own Federal Government 
-compel each one of us to urntemplate thermo- 
nuclear war at close range. We have lived with 
the p i b i l i q  of this ahmity for more than a 
decade. W e  must now reckon with its probability. 
No one in tbis audience, I suppe, will question 
my declaration that the Union, by resum- 
ing the t d n g  of nofear weapons, has increased 
the danger of war, f mspect, however, that I mu& 
document my charge that shelter-building in the 
U.S. also brings World War m cIoser. You should 
know at the outset that the doeurnentation will 
compel us here and POW to that eluse-mxage con- 
templation of thermonuclear war. When you have 
apprehended the nature of the war, I M e w  you 
d join me in the codusion that civil defellse is 
an illusion- an illusion that places our Wtut ion~  
and our l i v ~  in jeopardy. 
The citizen whosets out to etudy thermonuclear 
war d find himself richly supplied with litera- 
ture by hb Government. 1 h a ~ e  reviewed this 
materid, and I must tell you that I hd it to be 
incomplete md uneven in quality and reliability. 
The hard facts at the foundation of this lime- 
ture are the d t a  of the weapons m w  conducted 
by our Government over the past 16 years-some 
t 60 shots totaling about i so megatons of exphive 
energy. In spite of the magnitude of the eff- 
a experiments do not answer all our questions. 
For one thing, the results are not available to the 
citizen in the entirev. In the second place, t h e  
t& have bwn conducted in the wilderness of 
Nwada or on barren coral atolls in the South 
P W .  They do xmt, therefore, td us what a 
thermonuclear exploehn would actdly do to a 
crowded city at home-or to our forem and crop 
laads. For direct demomtmtion of what might 
happen here we have only the experience with the 
nominal atomichmb at Hkmhima and M a g d .  
But one quickly learm that e x p i e m e  with kilo- 
tan weapons has no direct applhtiofl to the 
potential effects of weapons in the  megaton range. 
On this fimited, iacomp1ete and uncertain data 
there has grown a vast sewndmy literature. Here 
one finds the fruit of pxhtispeculative investigations 
conducted by dvil defense agencies, by the Atomic 
h e r ~  C o d n  and the armed s e h ,  by 
certain academic indtutions and individuals and 
by such quasi-independent o r g ~ t l o n s  the 
Rand Carpration working under h r  the 
armed semim and other governmental agencies. 
Much of the matmid b convenimtly pckapd 
for reference in the of the several 
Congrw&nal h9aring.S on the biohgicd and en- 
vimmentaleffectsof nuclear war andcid defeme 
qpha those effm, that have made newspper 
headlines during the past ten years. 
Careful and cxiticd reading of the seeondray 
literattam s b  that the second- investigations 
it reports are no less specuIative for the fact that 
they have been conducted under the rubric of 
"operations research" and f d t u t e d  by the em- 
ployment of large cornputem. It is evident that 
the assumptions fed into the computers heavily 
t condition the results. 
The work reported in this literature is threaded 
with two major strands of bias. One strong bias 
originates from the desire to anvision and secure 
a sigdcant civil defense. As one witnees put it in 
the m r d  of a Congressionid hearing: ". . . we 
should always emphasize the d w n i  rather than 
the casualti= . . . 'it is not what you have lost 
that is most imprtant, but what you have left.' " 
Tbis human tendenq is entirely underritasbble 
in relation to the grave mttcmm of civil defense. 
Equally understandable is the pmmm of bias that 
flm from the militaq contribution to the litera- 
ture. One would expect military H e  to argue 
the validity of m i b y  solubm to political prob- 
lems, It is perhaps 1- undemtandable-andmrely 
less creditable-that their quasi-independent con- 
sultants should tell them what they want ta hear. 
But you should not be swprised to learn the con- 
clusion to wbich pre~sure from this quarter leads. 
This is that th-ucIw war is not only possible 
and probable but also feasible. 
Now those who advance the feasibility of tber- 
monuclear war do not Jaim that it is desirable. 
After living with the subject for more than a 
d d e ,  however, these authow have 1-ed not 
to shrink from horror. They fwe facts from which 
others recoil and dkquish between "a hopeless 
situation and a grim one," betwean a situation 
that "ooutd be verg serious" and yet "not ma- 
stmphic,," between an "unprecadented catas- 
mphe" and an " d h i t e d  one." From clw study 
of these dbtkctiom b y  conclude that it is 
pmible "to prevail in some meaningful sense of 
the tern" if "pot Win." 
In the calculus of feasibili~, you must realize, 
civil defense plays a decisive mle. Simple arith- 
metic shows it is the number of survivors that 
m h  the diffe-ce between an unrp.ecedented 
and an llnlimited atashophe. Here the objective 
of civil defenm p e a  a delicate paradox. In d 
humanity, we must emurage rn- that can 
save the Eves of individuals. In the national 
intsmt, one mu& seek to minimize the number 
of casualties. But if such measures enhance &e 
feasibility of thtwmmuclear war, then they may 
also raise the p b a b i l i q  of war. At best, they 
incream the likelihad of unprecedented catas- 
trophe. At worst, if tbe assumptiom on which the 
civil def~llse meas- are predicated prove to be 
wrong, they expose the nation and im people to 
unlimit~d c a m p h e .  
Tbe GIG dmtrine of our national cid defense 
policy is a Spartan one, By now it is familiar to 
most of us: "In an atomic war, b M ,  heat and 
initial radiation could kill &om dm to ground 
zero of nuelear bursts. Many more millions- 
werybody eb-could be threatened by d o -  
active fallout but most of these auld  be saved" 
No m b l e  ofKcial or codtant  suggests that 
a n p e  can be pmtected ageinst what are d e d  
the "prompt" efieet4 of nuclear weapons: the 
initial radiation, heat and b k  But people can 
be sheltered against fallout. It is qdmt fallout, 
therefore, that the uvil defense pgxam is 
ahemd 
Even at this d y  stage of pliblic hdmbjnation 
in civil defense, most p p l e  ham learned to dis- 
tinguish two Ends of falIout. Them is, on the one 
hand, the fallout that has dtd such conoarm 
during the r a n t  series of Soviet tests and earlier 
during the last scrim of tests conducted by the 
U.S. This is the world-wide fallout that follow 
a test explosion in the atmosphere; the radioactive 
k n  products are tramported doft by the fire- 
ball to be dissipated in the strntosphere and to 
mum to earth later in high dilution and after 
great attenuation of their lethal energy. 
There is, on the other hand, the  local fallout, 
which i~ of ( x ] ~  to civil defense. This fallout 
results when a nuclear weapon is burst on tbe 
ground. A major portion of the heat and blast 
energy is then transferred to the gmund itself. 
The explosion m o p  out a crater, and the &bell 
d e s  tons of v a p i z d  and melted material from 
the puad upward in the air. The Won products 
are n m  trapped in particles of grit and dust as the 
material in the fireball m h  and condenses. 
Secondarily, some of the material m p d  from 
the mater is irradiated to add to the poismoua 
mass of the cloud. Qdy the  fin^ partides b d  
upward in the  beball enter world-wide fallout. 
Some 80 percent of the fission products fall out 
locally, the heavi~t particles settling in a circle 
around the crater, the remainder riding on the 
wind to fall in hgh mneentrdn w the gmund 
downwind from p u n d  zero. 
This is the picture already engraved in the 
public imagination. There is a camamphe at the 
target, as at Hiroshima and N a g d ,  fmm which 
few egCBpe. There is local fallout from which t h e  
who are sheltered may escape. 
With this picture in mind, most people are 
surprised to be reminded that thew were no 
casualties from local fallout at Hiroshima or 
Nagasaki, The reason is that there was no local 
fallout in either of these catastrophes. As the 
Pr&dent explained at the time, the two bombs 
were detonated at a height calculated to minimize 
the generation of bd fallout, The President did 
not ga on to explain that they were detonated at 
e height ahdated to maximize the prompt effects 
of iniaial radiation, heat and bl- Them effects 
are mpprwed by as much as 40 percant in a 
pundbumt in exchange for the radiologi~al 
effem of local fallout or for the delivery of maxi- 
mum ground s h d  to a hardened military target. 
Thus, as the saying goes in the vulgar lexicon of 
nuclear warfare: "You can't have everything, 
even when you've got an absolute weapon." 
Since fallout is the only effect that ciril defense 
can oope with, you h d  the subject of fallout em- 
phasiid in civil defense. As one witness tmtiiied 
in June, 1959, before the Joint Conunittee on 
Atomic Energy: "Fallout and iits potentidy lethaI 
areas are important, but so are the areas of the 
0thw.efiects; the pendulum of interm has swung 
to fallout and them is some tendency to overlook 
the very important oth~r effects*'' 
It mds to mason that, if a maximum number 
of people are to be protected against fallout, then 
a maximum number of people must be exposed to 
fallwt in a given nuclear atta& Students of uviI 
defense ham given a great deal of time to the 
detailed invdgations of hypothetical fdout at- &. In the June 1959 h- fur example, 
k m  s m r d  agencies presented their 
findings on a hypothetical attack with a weight of 
about 1,500 megatons directed against milimy 
and civilian targets in the continental U.S. All 
the a63 weapons employed in this attack on 224 
targets were grwnd-burst. The computers, ap- 
plying the ratiw experienced at . tW and 
Nagasaki, showed 50 million mortal d t i e s ,  
plus i o &on surviving casualties c a d  by the 
prompt effects of these weapons. But they showed 
ro million more killed and lo million survi* 
injured as the result of e x p u r e ,  without protee- 
tion, to the effects of I d  fallout. The 1-1 of 
this study was that fallout shelters might have 
reduced mortal casualties by a5 pemnt and the 
number of injured by half. 
Even more dramatic results were re@ at 
the hearings hdd in August of this year by a sub- 
committee of the House Committee or! Govern- 
ment Operations under the chairmanship of 
Representative Chet HolifieId. The invwtigation 
mered a wide range of attacks, horn 3,000 to 
lo,ooo and on up to 30,000 megatons in total 
weight, directed pimadly at militay taxgets and 
emploging airbursts instead of pundbumts only 
when the "mfmed' of the target permitted. The 
charts showedthah in the absenw of civil defense 
precautions, total deaths might range fmm more 
than l o  percent to subtanMy loo p w n t  of 
the population, with &ties at the maximum 
when the entire weight of the attack was corn- 
mitted to pundbursts. With fallout shelters 
affording somewhat protection than those 
envisioned in the preent civil defense program, 
these figures were shown to be reduced by as much 
as 40 percent. With mare substantial fallout 
shelters that would a h  afford "nominal protee 
tiun against blast," the study showed mare than 
go percent of the population surviving the 3,000 
megaton attack aad as much as 60 pceat d v -  
ing the go,ooo megaton attack 
Such figures M n l y  come down with heavy 
weight on the side of preparing substantial fallout 
shelters. But the witness who reported an them 
figuras was careful to moderate their impact. H e  
pointed out that ". . . the outcomes of future at- 
raclrs are anything but predsely predictable. Fall- 
out could cream overwhelming disaster, but it 
might nut." And he added: ". . . it depends mast 
i m w t l y  on the kind of war the combatants 
may be prepared to @ h ~ "  
W e  shall return to tbis question of the kinds of 
war the combatants may 5ght in a moment. The 
feasibility of thermonuclear war involv~g another 
big qustbn that I should like to d d e r  with 
you now: 
I£ fallout sheltem can swum a submmtid num- 
ber of survivals, what kind of world will t h y  
survive into? As Governor Rockefeller's Corn- 
mime on Fallout Protection d&a the problem: 
"There are many unsettled questions as to what 
people should do, where they should go, to whom 
they should Loog when it is safe to leave sheitem." 
The mswem to these qudons are somewhat 
1- precisely predictable than the casualty ram. 
But they have been subjected to study, and the 
recuperation of the nation from at least one of the 
p s i b l e  wu-s.has been projected in a phmimry 
way* 
Skipping fie question of whether the weight 
of the attack was given to militarg or &civilian 
targets and whether casualties were- caused by 
pundbursts or airbun&, we are c;p&nted with 
the aftermath of a war that has devastated the 55 
largast metqxditan Mom of the U.S. A third 
of the population b been killed, half of our 
industrial cupcitJr d m e d .  
When it comm to recuperation, how-ever, we 
must look to what Bs left: two-thirds of the popula- 
tion and half of the nation's industrial capacity. 
It turns out, fmthmam, that we have lo& the 
more expendable p n i o n  of our total counny- 
the "A" country c o m p d  of the pdncipal met- 
ropolitan mghns, aa compared with the '*B" 
county of 1-r cities and rural countpide. $'It 
further turns out that. . . wb3e the A eountq 
cannot survive without a 3 ountry, the B country 
4 cannot only survive without the A countr~r; it elm 
seems to have the remms and sgilIs to rebuild 
the A country in about I o years." 
The achievement of such a rate of racoveq, 
however, depends on the a m m p t h  "that exten- 
sive reorganization d d  be aceompWd within 
perhaps six months." Accmdiq to the report, 
"the initial phase of mmmic act iv iq.  . . would 
be dominated by reorgmkathn problems. . . 
Some of the problems ape physical, such as the 
petding up of capital that has suffered only 
partial dmage (for ample ,  el* power grids, 
open-hearth furnaces without chimneys), h n -  
tambation of f&ee immobW by fallout, 
and even the dispod of millions of dead. Other 
pressing problems are institutional: pmemation 
of the governmental frmewmlq m r ~ t i o n  of
the monetary system and of decision-making 
a u h r i t y i n b u s i n w r s e n ~ , ~ b ~ h m e n t  
of markets fur consumer goods and raw matmiah 
(though doubtlm c o n w e d  in mtain -1, 
aad h a t i o n  of the labor few so that p p l e  
support t h m d v ~ s  by regular work (often in new 
~ p a t i ~ n s ) ) . "  The projected l%cqeMtion dm 
mumes that the m e  d d  nothave sustained 
my lowterm ps~"hdo&d disability from their 
experience, that the human germ plasm would 
t0le~at.e a prolo+ q u m  to levels of b d -  
gmmd radiation fm above tbe pment level and 
that &e environment would not have received 
any permanent s~~logiml  damage. 
It b anceded that these qudoas require 
deeper study. Recuperation ~%onomiuz, for ex- 
ample, involve% some d b t r w b g  variations on the 
familiar Malthusian equation. One student has I 
testified: ", . . the relative balance between sur- 
viving popdabu and surviving productive 1 
capaci?~ has a very important bearing on the 
problem of economic recupnition. . . . [A] situa- I 1 
tim could easily arb where the mmiving wealth 
p r  capita was greater than it is now. . . . [On] 
the other hand. . . most of our population m y  
surv ive . ,  . but the deskwtbn of proddve  
cnpaciv may make it difEcult to support the 
s u r v i w m  in the long m. Thus the relative 
imprhnce of the problems of recovery may be 
inversely related to the level of direct ppulation 
casualtie in tbe war.'' 
Still other questions remain to be studied. One 
e2qm bas termed these "the social, psycholqgi- 
cd, and moral problems of recuperation" 
and has said "these. . . are currently the hard 
q d m .  Many feel they are the dominating 
q- I? 
With all thea q&m remaining to be 
studied, it is to be doubted that the nation as a 
whole has accepted the fesibiity of themnonu- 
clew war. Whether the present Admkhtetion 
ha adopted thb t h d  I do not $now. One may 
supposer the prevailbq view i~ that the test of this 
byphegis may not be made at our choiw. In any 
we, the iimt steps in preparation for the experi- 
ment have now been taken. The Federal Govern- 
ment has launched a $goo d o n  program to 
s m e y ,  mark and supply ao million fallout shelter 
spaces in the central W. The President has 
pmnally enwuragd dtizens to build fallout 
sheltem on their OWXI premises and to stocg them 
for a twu-week stay. G o ' i  beyond the results 
from the computers, the papdarizers of the pro- 
gram promise that 97 percent will be saved. 
In the Pkdent's judgment, the sole function 
of the present program is to save the lives that 
can h saved. Civil d e h ,  he said, "cannot deter 
a nuclear attack." There is some k n t  from this 
narrow concept. Speaking for a great many mili- 
tary minds, General L~rman L. Lemnitzer has 
said "civil defense is a part of our total deterrent," 
in the sense that capacity to s k v e  and -per- 
ate is calculated to dmr the enemy from & i h g  
first. Still a third pition is advanced by some 
academic and qd-academic experts on the- 
nudear war; they prefer to believe that civil 
defense will Lenddbili?q to our nuclear amanal, 
giving it what they call "First-Strike M b i l i q "  
based on our capaciq to sustain a counteramck. 
"Here Wim the Erad of War" 
In the present atmosphere1 it is %cult ta re- 
call that 16 years ago the atomic scientists had 
proved war is obsolete as a means for arbitrating 
international political disputes. They did their 
best et the time to put this undemtadhg acmss. 
As Harold Umy pointed out, "atomic bombs don't 
land in the next b w  lea* d v m  to thank 
their lucky stars and. . . to hope the next bomb 
will also miss them." Urey and other scientists 
"thought the psibilitiies would be so apparent 
that when h d t y  saw what sciencm had done, 
they m d d  see immediately that here was the 
end of war." Since I gqg there has been no funda- 
mental change in the phJrsiee that underlis this 
mnclusion. No basic W v e r y  has made thermo- 
nuclear war either mom violent or more feasible. 
Long before Alamogodo, Urey's heavy-ww 
process had made the heavy h t q e s  of hydrogen 
abundantly available. The hydrogen bomb was 
implicit in the f d n  bomb. All that was needed 
was the technology that has come along hu l -  
tanmusly and independently in the U.S. and the 1 
U.S.S.R, and in other c o u n ~ ~  as well. 
To recapture the mood of the nuclear physicists I 
we must take a still closer la& at what happens 
in a nuclear explosion. We shall see that the 
d a t i o n  fmm Motom to megatons quires  re- 
consideration of the premises of civil defense. The 
nominal atomic bomb that terminated World 
Waf II is said to h a ~ e  had the destructive power 
of so kilotom of TNT. At Hiroshima the TNT- 
equivalent blast effect leveled a roughly circular 
area one mile in radius. The blast effect in this 
case overrode and o h d  the consequence of 
the other two prompt effects of the nudear ex- 
plosion. In the first instant of d-nation, the 
bmb had showered the same area of one mile 
radius with a lethal pulse of high enero radiatian. 
This is the "initial radiation" r e f e d  to in civil 
defense literatum, During the next few sernnds 
the &ball evolved and showered the same area 
of one mile radius with t h e d  energy sufficient 
to ignite ~WFIB and inflict third-depe burns on 
all human behp directly q m e d  within one 
mile of p u n d  zero. 
h e m i r a g  R e h m a  of TNT 
The destructive capacity of dl larger weapons 
is expmed on the same d e  of TNT-equivalent 
exphive power. But his mile has decreasing 
I 
relevance to the true nature of these weapons IS 
they grow larger. The ranges of the three prompt 
effects-Salradiation, heat and blast-inmase 
at different rates with inmaw in dm. This is rn 
say that the three concentric c i r d ~  of destruction 
and lethaliq that were  cot^ ' ow at Hirodha 
increase at sig&cantly different rates as tech- 
nology path more violenw into the n h  
) mat slowly because this radiation k absorbed a d  scattered, and it falls so far within the other two 
that it may be ignored. The cincle of total dema~ 
tiou by blast p w s  faster; its radius inaeasers as 
the cube mot of the hmeaw in TNT-equivalent 
tonnage. But the circular area showered with 
thermal radiation grows- the fastest of all& its 
radius inme- as the square root of the increase 
inpopver.Thustheareaengdfedintheincendky 
efbm of the bigger weapons reach- outward far 
beyond the perimeter of the blast W e .  
The tables show that the so-megaton b b ,  
which is 1,000 times b i i r  than the so-ldloton 
bomb, has a blast radius of lo miles (the cube root 
of I, 000) and an ~~ radius of go miles (the 
square root of 1,000). By the same token, the 
50-megaton bomb tested in the Soviet Union 
must have a b h t  radius of about 13 d e s  but an 
Wndiarg radius of 50; a loo-megaton bomb 
would have a blast radius of a h t  17 miIes and 
an ~~ radius of 70. If loo, why not 1,000 
megatons? Such a weapon would have an incen- 
diary radius of so0 miles. 
The mnd& to be comprehended here is that 
the bigger the weapon is, the more prqmnder8~1tIy 
it becomes an incen* weapon. Them are two 
d&ive elements in the incendiary effect of the 
big weapon. The fk t  is that the ignition of many 
fim at once thmaghout the 3,000 square mils 
around a so-megaton btzrst is sure to produca a 
gigantic single fire, a adbgration so huge that 
it must be reckoned as a meteomIogical event-a 
h t orm.  The blast &ect would d ~ t r o y  th 
mnml city, but the &storm would incinerate 
the metropolitan m a .  
Not much is said about 6restarms in the litera- 
ture of thermonuclear war and civil defense. For 
perfectly abvious reasons, tha effect is not one of 
thwe subjected to experimental study in the long 
serim of weaporu &, There was some exprience 
with h-wtom igpitmi by wdinarg incendiary 
bomb in World War XI: the h-emrm at Dresden 
is eathated to have killed goo,ooo people in a 
single night; at Hamburg, some 70,000; at Tokyo, 
aome aoo,ooo. B- bomb sheIters afforded 
no protection in these storma; their occupants were 
found sdhated and cremated when the shdwcs 
were opned. Tbe firestorm at Hhshhna burned 
inside the perimeter of the b b  effect. 
Tbb b- us to the second decisive element 
in the incendiary effect of the @ant weapons. That 
is the 4 e d  p m h e t e r - m a  ratio: as the 
radius of the M e  increases, the area within p 
up as the square of the hmease, and the edge of 
the firestorm moves fmher and farther away 
from p u d  m. A number of people at HirP. 
shima who had been sheltered from blast and 
heat e s ~ p e d  from inside the M e  of d e o n  
1 
before the firestorm took over. It was this q i -  
- 
en=, pmgr8md ktb the mmputem, that moder- 
ated the casualty edmam in the 1,500-megaton C 
poundburst attack petdated at the 1959 
hearings of the Joint m t t e e .  A far smaller 
pmmge of the ppulahn would empe from 
the vast interior of a so-megeton 
Up to tbIe point I: have not mentioned fallout 
in ~)nne&on with therPe big WeapI18. The 
is, of mumf that the fire and especially the blast 
effect of these weapons are maximized by air- 
burst, by detonating them in the atmosphere high 
off the ground at altitudes ppmioned to the she 
of the particular weapon and its h b a l I .  Under 
these &cumst- there is no 1 4  fallout. A 20- 
megaton weapon can, of course, be ground-burst. 
But it would not be profitable to use such a 
weapon for its radiologid effects, becam the 
quare mileage destroyed by its incendiary effect 
already approximates the area that could be 
covered by intense fallout. The same logic applies 
with increasing force to still larger weapons. 
Six W&em States 
In each case the h d i q  effect can be magni- 
fied stil l  further in exchange for blast effect by 
bursting the bigger weapons at very high altitude. 
Sin= most of the atmqhere- lies h r  to the  
ground, there is little loss of energy, and the cone 
of effective thermal radiation gaias a still wider 
radius at its base. A c m d q  w one set of calda-  
tiom, a I ,000-megaton bomb detonated at satellite 
altitude could set  six We&ern-Weatern, not 
Middle Western-states &re. 
It is evident fromthe literature that no adequate 
consideration has been given to the incendiary 
aspect of thermonuclear m. Fm was not men- 
tioned, for example, in connection with the fallout 
shelters that were supped to provide "nominal 
protection against blast" in the model fallout at- 
tacks d d b e d  at the HolifieId hearings in 
August. Yet any blast effect would be felt well 
inside the firworm. It was admitted at those 
hearings that there has been no m h  on 
"what might be called the environmental h e  
problem," that is, the burning of forem, prairies 
and croplands. It may be that the firestom is, 
indeed, unthinkable. 
Thmughout the lit81:etum it is implied that 
people and p r o m  outside the  bull'seye are safe 
from fire as well as blast. All they have to worry 
about, one gathem, is fallout. The fact is that the 
only thing they wn worry about is fallout. 
With public atlgietJr thus directed to fallout, the 
Admidmation's civil defeme program promises 
fdout ~~X&III. The Federal effort to establish 
fallout shelters in the central citiw will provide 
s ~ ~ n i f f a l l o u t i s t h e h a z a r d t o w h i c h  
the population is e x p a l .  If not, thse shelters 
will trap the urban populations ia bast and fire, 
Cwcurrently, the individual citizen is urged to 
provide for h h d  the fallout "protection best 
suited to his needs." The 60 pmant of the ppda-  
tion that has basements red ly  h b b  to it is 
advised to install a "basement shelter [that] can 
be built with soEd conmete bIocHs as a do-it- 
y o w l f  project" for f 150 to $200. Again, such a 
shelter wi l l  provide pmtedon if fdout (of the 
dimated inhnsiq) is the only hazard to which 
its occupants axe exped. Within the incendiary 
radius of a big bomb, however, the basement 
shelter becomes a firetrap. 
Even with fallout as the strategic hazard, there 
are other things to worry about. At the August 
hearing on c i d  defense an psented this 
mait of a hou88holder standing on his own 
properky "about s5 miles from an important, 
somewhat isow &at* target." The target 
comes under a so-megaton groundburst. "SUF 
viva1 depends on how much this man has found 
out about weapons effects, abut the precaution 
he needs to take, and above a l l  what he has actually 
done. For instance, a shelter with a shielding 
factor of loo m h  the radiation tolerable. Be- 
cause of the slower rate of delivery of thermal 
energ from the high-yield weapns, he can 
reduce effectively the number of caIoriea hi- 
him if he ducks behind mething opaque. After 
a few s a n d s  the bulk of the thermal energy will 
have been emitted and he then has about s 
minut- to get to a place whexe he'll be safe from 
flying g h  and other mhdes created by the bbc  
wave which travels at the sped of sound. De- 
pen* on the meteomlopal db, of 
course, the fabut cauld be co arrive in 
around BO minutas t~ an b u r  and continue to fall 
for about a to 6 h m .  Thus it can be ben that the 
effects of a detonation of so megatolls as qe- 
rienced at ag miles do not conhnt our man 
simultaneously. If he horn  the sequence of 
events, and if he lmom what he has t~ do to 
sumive, he has time to act. H e  does have to act 
correctly the first time or take the consequences. 
"At such &tames few knowledgeable, intel- 
l i n t  people need be hurt seriously." 
It is necessarg to add, from the t-ny of the 
same witness, that this man must take care not to 
look at the h b a l l  as it comas above the horizon: 
"* . . expriments during the tests above Johnston 
Mand in 1958 show that burns to the retina can 
cccw as far away as. . ,345 statute miles." One 
must mention also tbat "the pdbility of direct 
thermal radiation h e i i  transmitted by re-radia- 
tion into a shelter" is still under investigation. 
The idea that fallout mnstitutes the -pal 
hazard to the civilian population hi a derivation 
&om militaq theory. Remembering Pearl Har- 
bor, our military thinkem are l~~nvinced that the 
enemy will. lay the primary weight of hi4 attack 
on o m  milimy installations. We have the word 
from General Curtis E. laMay, who mmmanded 
the soth Air Fom in our strike again& Hiroshima 
and Negasaki: "There is no pint in going after 
th civilian population as such," The rust attack 
by the enemy wodd thedore be what is called a 
" m t e r f m "  attack, directed at the destmetion 
of our capcitJr to retaliam. With a substantial 
portion of our ret&a- f m  iadled in hard- 
ened missile basq  the enemy warheads would 
necessarily be ground-burst, and the civilian pop 
ulation would a ( x 0 ~ 1 y  come under heavy 
fallout as a side effect. 
kTo be &wive the weight of thh attack would 
have to be considerable. An independent study 
by a meted+ at the University of Arizona 
shows that 300 megamu A d  have to be laid 
in a few minu- on the 10 hardened Titan bases 
that ring the  city of Tucsan. The same considere- 
tiom apply apparently to other communities 
where missile basas have been installed within 
Iogbtidy convenient range: Wxchita and Salina, 
fiitth R d ,  A ~ k a n ~ a ~ ~  the Romt+Utim 
oomplex in New Ymk; Lincoln, Nebrash; Altw, I 
Oklahomaj Abilene, Texas, and Plattsburgh, New 
York, among others. With heavy pwdburrjt at- 
tacks directed at such tar-, the nearby com- 
munities wauld come under fallout of intensities 
far above thw against which the d ~ i t r y o d f  
basement shelter, supplied for two weeks of 
refuge, d d  a fbd  p t e h n .  Apparently the 
siting of m i d e  hm has oonsiderably depressed 
the prospas d muntq B. With the dtstrbution 
of other targets mom nearly appro- that 
of the economy and the ppdation as a whole, 
one can see the Iogic in Admiral Arleigh A. Burke's 
I ddaration that "in general nudear war migsite form can no longer attempt to destrop their enemy's counterpart without destmying the corporate body of the enemy state itself. . . ." 
The elaborate studies of the fallout hazard can 
be set aside entirely if the athker should chmw 
to attack the population directly instead of by 
side effect, As the expert who presented the 
hyphetid go,ooo-megaton fallout attack at the 
August civil defense hearing said: "So far as 
initid imp& of any a d  ia oancumed, the Ievd 
of fatalities is extremely sensitive to at-& de- 
sign.'' The attacker could, for example, adopt the 
strategy of "com&m plus bonus." By divert- 
ing lo pmt of the go,ooo megatons, or 3,000 
mqatons, to civilian targets he could, -ding 
to thig witnw, 'L$ill es many asr 190 miuion 
people." He would take as his bonus the substan- 
tially complete dastruction of U.S. civil'iatim. 
The population is a soft target and, as such, high1 J 
vulnerable to pmmpt e&a. It takes fewer 
megatons to $ill the -rate body of the state 
than to  d m y  the forces that are supped ta 
defend it. 
Civil defense, it is aid, "increases markedly 
our ability to survive war if [the wer] is fought by 
rational methods." But there is little reason t9 
think that a real war dl be fought by the rational 
strategies of game thwrg that are supplied as 
inputs to a computer, The experience of history 
s u g p t s  that the h exchange, if 'Lrati~n&*' 
will trigger an unlimited d a t i o n  of violence, 
going on to the final exhaustion and destruction 
of the hstded capacity for violence. W e  must 
remembm %hima as well as Peml Harhr. 
Not only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R but also 
their allies and satellite9 aad the neutrals in line 
of ftre faas the same dread w. W e  me as- 
s u r d t h a t t h e  empty worldof O n ~ b h b p u r e  
fiction. But the  Erestorm of a thermonuclear war 
could work an ir~evemible disruption of the d 
and moral fabric of Western civibtioa The 
kind of society that would emere h m  the 
sheltenr may be gu& from the kind of saciety 
that is prepahg to p into shelters now. 
The d a t i u n  ward the dtimate catastrophe 
ie already under way. We are passing. fmm an era 
of mearch and devdopment into an era of inter- 
continental push-button armaments in madinea 
for action. The major t4ermondear powers will 
soon have 0th- in their Sovian company. There 
will be Ingger wmp~ns and more of them, and 
earth satellites as well as &eta to deliver them. 
Acxoss the continents and under the maas, the 
weapns will b deployed in aver larger number 
and vmiety. The danger of the totally irrational 
addental war must mount as mnm2 over these 
weapons becomes attenuated over oonstantly 
lengthening chains of -d. 
We are p m d y  m e e a  to this d a t i o n ,  in 
the rising tide of dausness and brutality here at 
home. It is to be seen, at the top level of our 
Government, in the writing off of Tucsoa axid 
other d i e s  by the siting of missile bases in their 
immediate environs. It e m p  in an ugly way, at 
the middle level, in the vigilante league of Las 
Vegas and Bakewfield against the pmsptive 
flood of refugeas from h Angels It shames our 
people before the world in the climax of American 
privatism that @bes a sawed-off shotgun as 
equipment for the family f h t  shelter, 
The civil defense progrm of our Federal 
Government, however else intended, must be 
regarded as a step in the d a t i o n  m. This 
is a sinister development because it works a 
psychological subvmion nf both Government and 
citizenrjr. It gives the sanetion of action to the 
delusion that a thermonuclear war can be fought 
and survived. It encowages statesmen to take 
larger risks predicated on Fint-S- Credibility 
and Post-Attack Recupt ive  Capacity. It dis- 
engap the citizen from vigihw over the ration- 
ality and responsibility of elected officials. 
On the other side of the world power contest, in 
satisfaction d the equations of war-game theory, 
it invites a Pmemptive Strihe. For the dubious 
proteetion it pro- civil defense has e& a 
dangerom CQ& to national security. 
It is clear that, in l a u d h g  ib fallout-shelter 
program, the Administration haa sought to find a 
compromise. Between the stiU overwhelming 
popular reluctance to accept violence as a m y  of 
life on the om hand and the p r m  to "do some- 
thing" on the other, the Administration has cut 
its problem down the middle. 
Pressure From Two Qlaarters 
The Administration has yielded to p~essure 
from essentially two quartexs. The &st originates 
with irmpmible politicians in both @EYE who 
have adopted fallout defense as a mode of politid 
dynamism. The second and much more significant 
~ u r e  originam with the military and its corn- 
mitment to miliw solutions, backed by the 
pwerful economic interest in those solutions that 
has came to be the biggest business in the land. 
But a primmy respomibility for this hoax on 
public opinion must be attributed to thorn authors 
of fraud by computer who produced the literature 
that argues the feasibiliq of thermonuclear war. 
The Adminkhation's pudme of thidi hoax 
raises two grim p d d i t i e s .  F'ht,  it may have 
seriously cornprombed its capacity to rally public 
opinion in favor of the settlemeats it is seeking to 
negotiate at the conference table. Smnd, in the 
mood of mounting fear and truculence, the Ad- 
ministration may h d  it has provoked demapgic 
b a r  fop a civil defense program ping far be- 
yond the present one. 
Such programs have been studied and estimated 
in a preliminar~r way. The down payment on the 
cost of taking the nation underground would be 
$150 Won. But that is ody the fiscal cost. The 
social cost of ping underground would not fall 
short of the tQtal transformation of our way of 
life, the suspension of our cia ix&tutions, the 
habituation of our people to violence and the 
ultimate militarbtion of our &ety. By that 
h e  it would surely be dEcult to defme the 
ideological d c t  that the war is supped to be 
fought about, And by that time the technolqy 
of themnucle8r war will no doubt be equal to 
hunting out its targets undergmund. 
If this analysis s w  that a third alternative 
to the choice of surrender or death may be found 
in the Garrison State, let me urge a fourth alter- 
native. We must accept the truth that themw 
nuclear war cannot settle even the most M n d -  
able conflict to anybody's satisfaction. With all 
due caution, at the present stage in the escalation 
of temu; we must seek the settlement of political 
differences by peaceful means. Concurrently we 
must seek an immediate halt in the anas race and 
thereafter general and complete disarmament 
under cantrols that will protect mankind fram its 
resumption. The two elements are inseparable; 
for it is clear that there would be no German 
problem if we had disarmament and that there 
can be no convention on disarmament that does 
not include China. 
The C o h u d m  of Wi9tor-y 
History has lagged behind the p r o w  of tach- 
now, md now an unpreoedented emergency 
mnfrom the mntinuation of history. The conflia 
that hang over from the gcad old pthermonu- 
clear days cannot be arbitrated by war. They must 
be settled before madness, stupidity, accident or 
the arms race itself precipitates the war. If we 
enter into n m t i o n  in distrust and fear of the 
other party, we must b a r  in mind that the other 
party beam the same distrust and fear of us. If w e  
think they la& our sophisticated appreciation of 
the menace of thermonuclear weapons, let us re- 
calI that they have fresh in memory their a5 
d o n  dead of World War 11. Both sida are 
driven to the conferem8 table by the same iron 
I 
compulsion that flows from the thermonuclear 
inversion of the Golden Rule. 


